One of the major constitutional innovations that accompanied the transition from the authoritarian rule to more competitive and pluralistic modes of governance at the end of the 20th century in Africa was the adoption of presidential term limits. What have been the effects of term limits on personal rule in Africa? What do the ordinary African themselves think about these rules? Why have some presidents passed legislation that has removed term limits when others abandoned similar efforts and stepped down? These were some of the main questions that this dissertation had sought to address. Through a methodological approach that employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodological tools, the study's major findings show that term limits were embraced as a tool for addressing a proclivity among African presidents for personalizing power and remaining in office for long periods. And despite the recent attempts to remove term limits, these rules have helped to transform the African presidency in very important ways. By providing proof that other individuals in society possess leadership abilities, leadership alternations resulting from tenure limits are helping to undermine the justifications for personal rule which were built on the premise that only certain individuals were imbued with leadership qualities.While term limits were widely welcomed and embraced by the public, recent African history has been dominated by attempts by incumbent presidents seeking to revert to the old norm of prolonging tenure. This suggests that despite the transitions towards more competitive political systems, the culture of personal rule refuses to die. While a handful of these bids have been rejected, a high proportion have been passed, resulting in the removal of term limits in almost half of the countries that had only recently embraced tenure limits on the African continent. In trying to discern the reasons to explain the differential outcomes of the third-term bids in Africa, the study's major findings show that the attempts to remove term limits are affected by a host of institutional factors that either aide or frustrate these bids. On one hand, several institutions such as higher government legislative majorities, the military background of the incumbent president, the use of violence, ruling party cohesion and traditions of respect for authority, among others, aide the removal of term limits. On the other hand, institutions such as the precedent of prior alternation, legislative fractionalization, aid dependency, ethnic fractionalization, a united and active civil society, among others, contribute to the rejection of the bids to remove term limits. The other notable findings from the study are that patronage was not a sufficient strategy for removing term limits and that its effect was dependent on the state's ability to identity and punish patronage clients that defaulted by voting against the removal of term limits. In the final analysis, the study concludes by arguing that the bids to remove term limits reflect the enduring personalism in African politics and that informal institutions played a more critical role in influencing the removal of term limits, thus echoing the findings of other studies that suggest that informal institutions continue to play an important role in the African political arena, notwithstanding the transitions that sought to promote formal institutionalism.
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