The amount of research on non-human animals has grown exponentially over the last fifteen years, with philosophers bringing unique insights to questions concerning duties owed to non-human animals (ethics) and animal capabilities (metaphysics), such as if animals possess reason or use concepts. The two fields focused on the later questions are animal metaphysics and post-humanism. This dissertation project is firmly situated at the nexus between ethics and metaphysics, as it grapples with the fundamental metaphysical frameworks that form the foundations of philosophical work on animal minds and draws connections between this work and the application of ethics in human-animal contexts.The purpose of this dissertation is to further develop an outline for what I call a “metaphysics of caution” or the practice of being attentive to potentially harmful assumptions and biases that could be incorporated into theories of animal capabilities. While work in animal metaphysics and post-humanism has remained theoretical, theories coming out of these schools inform applied philosophical branches and help guide human action towards non-human others. For this reason, we need to be careful when exploring such questions, as this work has real world implications. Specifically, this dissertation 1) explores how work on animal capabilities is influenced by metaphysical, normative, and epistemological assumptions and 2) draws upon feminist philosophy of science to illustrate how this school of thought can help address issues of bias. The project of critiquing animal metaphysics and post-humanism is an important first step, as it helps us to identify commitments that could bias theories of animal capabilities.
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